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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The German Minister of  Finance, Dr. Theo Waigel, presented in November a proposal for 
a "Stability Pact for Europe" ("Stabilitatspakt fur Europa") to ensure budgetary discipline 
in  the final  stage of economic  and  monetary union.  The  text in  German  circulated  to 
Ecofin ministers on 10 November 1995 was also accompanied by an unofficial translation 
into English. 
The present note contains a first  set  of reflections  by  the  Commission  services  on the 
stability pact proposal.  Its various aspects -economic, budgetary, legal and procedural-
are commented upon, and a preliminary examination is made of how such a pact can be 
put into practice in full conformity with the Treaty on European Union. 
The note is intended as a contribution to the debate sparked off by the German proposal. 
It in no way attempts to set out the conclusions which the Commission may reach at the 
end of  this period of  discussion or to prejudge the preferred options of  the Commission. 
At this stage not all the aspects of  the stability pact proposal have been subject to the same 
degree of scrutiny.  In particular, the question of the appropriate scale of sanctions to be 
applied when budgetary limits are not respected has not yet been examined. 
2.  ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS 
2.1  THE IMPERATIVE OF BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
The  oYerriding  concern  of the  stability  pact  is  to  provide  the  necessary  conditions  to 
'ensure fiscal discipline in stage three of economic; and monetary union. A sound budgetary 
policy,  by  supporting the anti-inflationary commitment of the European Central Bank"  is 
essential to bring about the optimal policy mix for EJ\1U as  a \vhole and  for the indi\'iduai 
members. 
\Vhile  clearly  stating that no  re-negotiation of the 1v1aastricht  criteria for participation in 
the single currency is envisaged: the "stability pact" puts forward a number of  proposals to 
implement  a  permanent  fiscal  discipline  in  stage  three.  Member  States  should  enter  a 
voluntary commitment encompassing the following elements: 
- respecting the  3o/o  deficit  limit  set  in  the  Treaty,  even  in  economically  unfavourable 
periods, with exceptions being granted only in extreme cases; 
- setting a medium term goal  of 1%  of GDP for the cyclically-adjusted  budget deficit, 
thereby providing a safety margin of2% of  GDP under the 3o/o mandatory ceiling; 
- reducing progressively the stock of debt even below the level of  60°/o of GDP indicated 
in the Treaty. 
- keeping down the share of the public sector in the economy by,  in particular, bringing 
down the rate of  growth of  public expenditure below that of  nominal GDP; - 4 -
According to the proposal, this set of  commitments, by ensuring a reduction in the interest 
burden on public debt, would allow to focus government expenditure on public investment 
whilst gaining room for manoeuvre to limit future budget risks. 
The imperative of budgetary discipline underlying the stability pact, both in the run up to 
EMU and beyond, is in line with the 1995 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines,  approved 
by the Council in July  1995, which indicate that Member States should  aim  at  bringing 
down their budget deficits below 3% of GDP as soon as possible,  as a first step towards 
the medium-term goal of close to balanceO).  As in the proposal for a stability pact, the 
Broad  Guidelines  stress  that,  in  order  to  attain  this  objective,  restraining  public 
expenditure increases should be preferred, in many countries, to raising taxation. 
2.2  THE BENEFITS OF SOUND PUBLIC FINANCES IN STAGE THREE 
Maintaining budgetary discipline  in  stage three is  an  essential  condition to  reap  all  the 
benefits of  the single currency. 
The positive effects of  sound public finances can be summarised as follows: 
i)  by fostering lo\v and  stable inflationary expectations,  low budget  deficits  and  debts 
will help in  maintaining stable prices.  They will  also  reduce the likelihood of or the 
economic  costs  of a  possible  market  test  of the  anti-inflationary  credibility  of the 
newly established European Central Bank. 
ii)  a  sound  fiscal  policy,  by  allowing  a  reduction  in  interest  rates  and  "croYvding  in" 
private investment will lead to a higher growth of  the capital stock in the medium and 
long run.  This  will  help in  shifting the  economy  onto  a higher  grO\\·th  path  and,  by 
reducing the scarcity of capital,  will  be  reflected in  permanently lo\ver real  interest 
rates. As stressed in the recent report by the G-1 0 countries(2), since the Union has an 
important weight in the international economy, these developments \Vill  lead to lower 
interest rates \Vorld-\vide, thereby contributing to step up gro\v1h at the global JeYe1. 
iii)  building  higher  public  savings  is  important  in  order  to  face  the  budgetary 
consequences of demographic developments.  The ageing of the population and  the 
consequent rise  in  dependency  ratios  will  inevitably  put  a  heavy  burden  on  social 
spending,  which  will  be  only  partly  compensated  by  higher  private  sector  savings 
related  to  the  possible  spreading  of private  pension  schen1es.  Furthermore,  the 
contribution  of private  sector  savings  is  likely  to  be  eroded  as  a  consequence  of 
ongoing financial  liberalisation which will tend to ease households'  access to credit 
and insurance markets. 
(1) Outside Europe, the medium-tenn objective of eliminating the budget deficit has been introduced, e.g., 
in the United States' budget law. 
(2)  Group ofTen, "Saving, Investment and Real Interest Rates
11
,  October 1995. - 5-
iv)  as stressed by the proposal for a stability pact, fiscal discipline, by curbing public debt 
ratios and hence reducing the interest burden on public debt, ·will allow to restructure 
government spending by devoting a higher share of  public money to political priorities 
such  as  education.  It will  also  help  in  reverting  the  downward  trend  in  public 
investment which, in a number of  Member States, has attained historically low levels. 
v)  lower deficit and debt levels create more room to cope with adverse economic events. 
This  is  particularly  important  once  the  single  currency  is  in  place  because  the 
accommodation  of country-specific  shocks  will  then  to  a  higher  decree  rest  with 
budgetary policy  (and  will  also  rely  on the  improved  functioning  of product  and 
labour markets). 
2.3  ECONOWC Th1PLICATIONS OF A UNIFORM NATIONAL BUDGET DEFICIT 
The stability pact envisages a uniform medium-term target of 1% of GDP for the budget 
deficit across EMU as a clear commitment by Member States to permanently sound public 
finances. 
Four factors  have to be  considered  in  assessing  the  economic  consequences  of such  a 
requirement: the need to increase public saving in  order to face the budgetary impact of 
ageing; ·the implications for the level of the primary surplus,  especially in  countries with 
high  initial  levels  of public  debt;  the  interaction  between  budgetary  discipline  and  real 
convergence; and the necessary safety margin to cope with cyclical developments.  These 
four factors are briefly examined below. 
2.3.1  THE QUEST FOR HIGHER PUBLIC SECTOR SAVING 
As  pointed  out in  the previous  section,  there is  a need  to make room for  higher public 
saving  in  order  to  cope  with  demographic  developments.  This  applies  particularly  to 
certain econon1ies \vhich, in  all likelihood, need to go beyond the 1  ~/o target by  aiming at  a 
balanced budget and possibly even at a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus. 
Four countries,  namely  Derunark,  Finland,  Sweden and  the  UK,  in  line  \vith  the  policy 
indications of the Broad Guidelines,  have already introduced the objective of elinlinating 
the deficit or moving to a surplus in their convergence programmes.  Other countries \vi11 
probably need to move in that direction. 
2.3 .2  THE Th1PLICATIONS FOR PRIMARY SURPLUSES 
A sustained budget deficit  of 1  o/o  of GDP  implies,  under a  "normal
11  rate  of growth of 
nominal GDP of5%, a long-run equilibrium level ofthe public debt of20o/o ofGDP. More 
importantly, with 1% budget deficit, even highly indebted Member States would be able to 
achieve a marked reduction in the debt ratio in a reasonable period. - 6 -
As shown in Table 1 in Annex, under the assumption of a 5% constant yearly growth of 
nominal GDP, a sustained 1% budget deficit allows a country with an initial debt ratio of 
120% of  GDP to reduce that stock by almost 40 percentage points within ten years. Under 
the same assumption, a sustained budget deficit of 3% of GDP allows to bring down the 
stock of  debt below 100% of  GDP within the same time span. 
The "degree of hardship"  in bringing down and  sustaining a  1%  of GDP budget deficit 
-i.e. the required primary surplus- depends on the_ initial level of  the stock of debt and on 
the interest  rate-growth rate differential.  For instance,  under  the  assumption  of a  2% 
interest rate-growth rate differential,  a country with an initial stock of debt of 120% of 
GDP requires primary  surpluses of between 5.5% and  7.0% of GDP for five  to seven 
years to sustain a  constant budget deficit of 1%  of GDP  (see Table 1  ).  As  a  point of 
comparison the estimated primary budget surplus of Belgium and Italy in  1995 was 4.5o/o 
and 3. 6% of  GDP respectively(3). 
Once the 3% of  GDP deficit has been achieved, consideration will have to be given to the 
time  span for  the transition  to the tighter deficit  target  (of say  1%  of GDP  as  in  the 
stability pact).  Factors to be taken into account  should include the initial  level  of debt: 
setting ·too  short  a  period  for countries with a high  initial  level  of public  debt,  would 
require historically large primary surpluses(  4).  However, joining the  single  currency,  by 
resulting in  the abolition  of the exchange  risk  premium in  interest  rates,  would  clearly 
contribute to create the right conditions for bringing bring down the deficit belo\v the 3% 
ceiling. 
2.3 .3  FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND REAL CONVERGENCE 
Member  States that  are  experiencing  a  catching-up  process  need  comparatively  higher 
leYels of both private and public investment. Indeed. public investment can,  jn many cases, 
be con1plementary to private investment. 
Higher govern1nent  spending,  especially  in  less  favoured  countries,  can  be  accepted  as 
long as it goes to investment to modernize their infrastructure or to measures aiming,  for 
instance,  at  upgrading education and  human resources.  Furthermore,  as  shown in  Annex 
Table 5,  since  catching-up  countries  anticipate  a  steeper  gro\vth  pace,  they  can  run 
relatively  higher  deficits  without  endangering  the  sustainability  or  the  progressive 
reduction of  their public debt. 
Art.  1  04c(3)  of the  Treaty,  by  echoing  the  so-called  "golden  rule"  of government 
financing(5), in1plicitly recognises both these elements by stating that, in assessing \Vhether 
the budget deficit complies with the convergence criterion, it should be taken into account 
(3) Commissionls economic forecasts, November 1995. 
(4) The  Annex  presents  some  numerical  simulations  in the  case  of a gradual  reduction  in the  budget 
deficit  (Table 3), as  well  as  the  data on the  cyclically adjusted primary  surplus  in EU  countries in 
periods of fiscal discipline since the beginning of the 1980s (Table 4). 
(5) This rule is explicitly mentioned in Germany's federal state constitution. - 7 -
"whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and(.  .  .) all 
other relevant factors,  including the medium-tern1  economic and budgeta1y position of 
the Men1ber State". Hence, imposing very restrictive deficit/debt limits for those countries 
could  either  slow  down  the  catching-up  process  or  provide  incentives  for  public 
authorities in less favoured countries to call for budget transfers via the EU budget. 
Moreover, any implementation at national level of  the policy indication in the stability pact 
proposal of progressively reducing the public expenditure ratio would need to take into 
account the below-average levels of expenditure in the catching-up  countries  and  their 
greater public investment needs. It is clear, however, that it is paramount for less favoured 
countries to keep  their public  finances  on a  sustainable  course  in  order to foster  the 
confidence process underpinning domestic and foreign investment. For instance, as many 
public investment projects will never fully pay for themselves, a mechanical application of 
the "golden rule" may lead to excessive borrowing. 
2.3.4 THE  BUDGETARY  ROOM  FOR  MANOEUVRE  TO  A.CC0!\1MODATE 
CYCLICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The stability pact allows countries to let automatic stabilizers work during periods of  weak 
conjuncture,  as  long  as  the  budget  deficit  does  not  exceed  the  3o/o  ceiling.  As  the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit is set at 1% of  GDP, the safety margin equals 2% of GDP. 
However, in the past there has been quite a number of periods when the needed room for 
manoeuvre was larger than  2%  of GDP.  As  shown by  Table 6  in  Annex,  in  years  of 
economic  slack  during  the  period  1980-94,  in  one  out  of three  cases,  the  cyclical 
component of the budget deficit  in  EU countries was larger than  2~/o of GDP  and  the 
variability of  budgetary positions in  smaller countries is  considerably (over a third) higher 
. than in  larger countries  Smaller econornies are more open than large ones,  hence they are 
more affected by external developments. Over and above this, since smaller economies are 
usually less diversified, sectorial shocks are more likely to spread to the whole economy. 
In El\fU, \Yith  a single monetary policy, the shock absorption function of public budgets is 
likely  to increase thereby  ~'idening the desirable  safety margin,  especially in  the  case of 
sn1aller countries. This may prove difficult in cases where the sustainable budget deficit is 
higher. 
2.4  OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
In the light of the above analysis of the proposal for a stability pact, the follo\ving general 
points can be made: 
i)  the need to ensure budgetary consolidation in Stage three of EMU beyond reaching 
the 3% Maastricht limit does not represent a novelty:  it  confirms the medium-term 
policy indication of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines which has  already  been 
introduced in the convergence programmes of  four Member States. - 8 -
ii)  A  deficit  target  of 1%  of GDP  seems  arbitrary:  a  medium-term  goal  of close  to 
balance,  as  set  in  the  Broad  Guidelines,  is  preferable  also  to  accommodate  the 
budgetary consequences of  negative cyclical developments. 
iii)  The simple  budgetary projections presented in Annex show that,  under a  "normal" 
rate of growth of nominal  GDP,  a  budget deficit  of 3% of GDP  or below  allovvs 
countries with  a  high  initial  stock  of debt  to reduce  consistently  their  debt  ratio. 
Therefore, provided that the 3% requirement is satisfied, a commitment to achieving 
and sustaining in the medium run a budget deficit clearly lower than 3% of GDP,  as 
stated in the Broad Guidelines under usual circumstances would imply respect of the 
debt .criterion. 
iv)  The  analysis  developed  above  suggests  that  a  certain  differentiation  in  national 
medium-term budgetary targets may be desirable from an economic point of  view. For 
example,  different  initial  levels  of public  debt  ratios  and  different  requirements  in 
terms  of real  convergence  call  for  a  flexible  articulation  of national  budgetary 
positions within the deficit ceiling set by the Treaty.  Furthermore,  setting a uniform 
deficit  target  of 1%  of GDP  might  make  it  more  difficult  for  policy  makers  to 
convince the public  of the need to persist in their consolidation efforts beyond  the 
EMU-wide  objective.  Therefore,  the  budgetary  objective  mentioned  in  point  ii) 
should  preferably  apply  to EI\1U  as  a whole  and  not  uniformly  to  each  individual 
country. However, under these circumstances the question arises of  hovv to make sure 
that a coherent budgetary stance at the EMU level is attained. 
3.  LEGAL A~TI  11\STITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
This chapter exar11mes  the  \·arious institutional  and  legal.arrangements \Yithin  the  Treaty 
framework  for  developing  a  stability  pact.  Essentially,  three  broad  legal/institutional 
options are available: 
- exploit  existing  Treaty  arrangeinents  under  Article  103  dealing  \Yith  the  broad 
econon1ic policy guidelines and multilateral surveillance; 
exploit  existing  Treaty  arrangements  under Article  1  04c  dealing  with  the  excessive 
deficit procedure; 
- develop  a  nevv  arrangement.  Legal  measures  could  perhaps  be  adopted  under 
Article 23 5.  Alternatively,  a  stability  pact might  consist  of a  political  agreement  or 
commitment, for example in the form of  European Council conclusions. 
The focus here is  on the first two options, i.e.  how a stability pact could be implemented 
within existing  Treaty arrangements under Articles  103  and  1  04c.  The  development  of 
alternative  arrangements under Article 23 5  or some  form  of political  agreement  is  not - 9 -
addressed  in  detail,  but  nonetheless  a  number  of features  are  highlighted  which  any 
alternative arrangement would have to respect. 
3.1  GENERAL TREATY PROVISIONS 
There is no doubt that the Treaty provides for national budgetary policies to be a matter of 
common concern in EMU so as to ensure sound public finances.  Article 3a of the Treaty 
specifies. that close  co-ordination of Member  States'  economic  policies  falls  within the 
scope  of the  activities  of Member  States  and  the  Community  in  EMU.  Moreover, 
Article 3a states that both economic and monetary policies in EMU entail compliance with 
the guiding principle of sound public finances.  As Article 3  a contains a direct reference to 
Article 2 which specifies the objectives of the Treaty, it follows that the co-ordination of 
Member States' budgetary polices and the principle of sound public finances have general 
application.  This  is  reaffirmed  in  Article 1  02a and  in  practical  terms  is  spelled  out in 
Articles 1  03,  1  04,  1  04a,  1  04b  and  1  04c (and  the  associated  Protocol  on the excessive 
deficit procedure). 
Although the focus of  attention in any stability pact would be on constraints to be imposed 
on  the .level  of public  sector  deficits,  it  should  be  borne· in  mind  that  Article  104 
prohibiting  monetary  financing,  Article  1  04a  prohibiting  privileged  access  to  financial 
institutions  and  Article  1  04b  establishing  the  no  bail  out  rule  are  very  strong  Treaty 
provisions  relating  to  national  budgetary  policy.  Treaty  provisions  affecting  national 
budgetary policy are listed in the annexed table. 
3.2  ARTICLE 103:  BROAD  ECONO:MJC  POLICY  GUIDELINES  Al'ID 
l\1lJLTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE 
Article l 03( l) requires  ?\I ember  States to  regard  their  economic  polices  as  a  matter 
common concern  and  to  co-ordinate  them  within  the  Council.  Article 1  03(2)  specifies 
arrangements for the adoption of the broad  economic policy  guidelines  and  multilateral 
surveillance. The provisions are identical for participating iv1ember States and those Vv·ith  a 
derogation, including Denn1ark and the United Kingdom. 
The  objectives  of the  proposed  stability  pact  and  Article 103  are  shared  given  that 
Article 1  03(3) states that if the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent 
with the broad economic policy guidelines, "or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of 
the  economic  and monetary  union",  then  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of a  Commission 
recommendation,  may  adopt  appropriate  recommendations  by  qualified  majority  voting 
rules.  The  Council  could  decide  to  make  these  public  agam  on  the  basis  of qualified 
majority voting following a Commission proposal. 
To  date,  this  option  has  not  been  exercised.  Such  an  act  of public  censure  could  be 
expected  to  impact  on  public  opinion  in  the  country  concerned.  It would  certainly 
influence market perceptions possibly leading to a downgrading in the credit rating of  the 
Member State in  question.  Therefore,  significant indirect political and financial  sanctions - 10-
are available to the Council under Article 103. It could therefore provide the legal base for 
those aspects of  a stability pact where no direct financial sanctions are foreseen. 
Article  103 ·could,  however,  not fully  satisfy the stability pact proposal as  it  stands  for 
several  reasons.  Firstly,  although  there  can  be  some  differentiation  in  policy 
recommendations  between  Member  States,  the  decision-making  under  Article 1  03 
encompasses  all  Member  States  and  not just  those  participating  in  EMU.  Secondly, 
measures taken under Article 103  could not be  automatic.  Thirdly,  no  direct  financial 
sanctions are available. 
3.3  ARTICLE 104C: EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
3.3.1  A  REVIEW  OF  TREATY  PROVISIONS  GOVERNING  THE  EXCESSIVE 
DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
A detailed description of the existing arrangements'  for the excessive deficit procedure is 
required in  order to isolate those elements of the proposed stability pact which could be 
incorporated under Article  1  04c.  Governments under Article  1  04c are required  to avoid 
excessive deficits in accordance with reference values established in the excessive deficits 
protocol.  (6) It is a four-step procedure as follows: 
- If  a Member State fails to fulfil either the debt or deficit criteria, or if  there is a risk that 
it  will  do  so,  the Commission  shall  prepare a report which  shall  take  account  of all 
relevant factors.  Article 1  04c(6) requires the Council  to  decide  by  qualified  majority 
whether an  excessive  deficit  exists  after  having  considered  the  observations  of the 
:~v1ember State concerned. All  ~!ember States participate in this vote, including l\1ember 
States with a derogation and the Member State concerned. 
- Lnder i\rticle 1  04c(7), the Council  shall  make recommendations to the I\lember State 
concerned \Vith a vie\v to bringing the situation to an end within a given period. Article 
1  04c( 13)  determines the voting procedureC7),  in  which all  Member States participate 
aside  frorn  the .tv1en1ber  State concerned.  These  recomn1endations  shall  not  be  n1ade 
public.  Ho\vever,  the Council may  decide to n1ake  the  recomn1endations  public if  no 
effective action is taken \vithin the period laid do\vn.  The same voting rules  appl~, in this 
case. 
It  is  at  this  stage  that  Articles 1  04c(9)  and  1  04c(ll)  introduce  additional  measures 
applying to participating Member States if  they persistently fail to implement the Council's 
recommendations.  Member States with  a  derogation  are  exempt  from  these  provisions 
under Article  1  09k(3) and  consequently their respective voting rights  are  also  ren1oved 
under Article 1  09k( 5). 
(6}Detailed rules and definitions are set out in Council Regulation EC/3605/93  of 22.11.93  adopted in 
accordance with Article 104c(14). 
(7) "  ...  the Council  shall act on  a  recommendation from the Commission by a majority of  two  thirds of 
the  votes of its  members weighted in  accordance  with  Article  148(2),  excluding  the  votes of the 
representative of  the Member State concerned." - 11  -
- Article 104c(9) states that "the Council may decide to give notice to the Member State 
to  take,  within  a  specified  time-limit,  measures for  the  deficit  reduction"  judged 
necessary by the Council. The Council may also request the Member State concerned 
to submit  reports ·on its  adjustment  efforts.  If the Member  State concerned  fails  to 
comply with this Council decision, then Article 1  04c(11) allows the Council to impose 
a number of  sanctions(8). Council decisions under Article 1  04c(9) and 1  04c( 11) shall be 
tak~v by the Council on the basis of a  recommendation from the Commission by a 
majority of two thirds of the votes of countries without a  derogation  excluding the 
votes of  the Member State concerned. 
The final step concerns the abrogation of  an excessive deficit and re-introduces derogating 
Member States with a derogation to Council decision making. 
- Article  I 04c(12)  provides  for  the  Council  to  abrogate  some  or  all  of the  above 
decisions to the extent that the excessive deficit, in the view of the Council,  has been 
corrected.  Voting on the abrogation of Council decisions  shall  be undertaken on the 
basis  of Article 104c(13),  i.e.  all  Member  States  excluding  the  Member  State 
concerned. Interestingly, this implies that Member States with a derogation will vote on 
the de facto abrogation of  measures adopted under Articles 1  04c(9 & , 11 ),  even though 
they did not· participate in the vote to impose the~e measures. 
3.3.2 CO:MPARING  THE  EXCESSIVE  DEFICIT  PROCEDURE  MTD  THE 
STABILITY PACT PROPOSAL 
A key· difference arises as regards the automatic nature of certain arrangen1ents. Under the 
stability pact,  a Member State would be automatically in  breach of obligations  once its 
go\·ernment  deficit  passes  3~o of GDP  unless  prior  authorisation  has  been  gi\·en  a 
Stability Council in the case of very exceptional circumstances. Under the excessive deficit 
procedure, a country is only in an excessive deficit after a Council decision.  Moreover~ 3% 
of GDP is considered as a reference value and giYes the Council discretion to take account 
of  all relevant factors. 
A common feature is  the ability to impose sanctions on countries participating in El\fU, 
and notably the requiren1ent to make a non-interest bearing deposit.  However, under the 
proposed stability pact,  they -vvould  be immediate,  auton1atic  and  be  in1posed  at  a fixed 
level. It could be questioned whether the level of sanctions proposed in the stability pact 
respects  the  principle  of proportionality  established  in  Article 3b.  Sanctions  under  the 
(8) Four options  are' available:  a  requirement to publish additional information,  to  be specified by  the 
CounciL before issuing bonds and securities: an invitation to the EIB to reconsider its lending policy to 
the Member State concerned; requiring the concerned Member State to make a non-interest bearing 
deposit of appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit decision has been abrogated 
by the Council; the imposition of  fines of  an appropriate size. - 12-
excessive  deficit  procedure  are  only imposed  after  a  country  has  failed  to  implement 
Council recommendations. In addition, the Council has a range o(  sanctions from which to 
choose, and retains discretion to set sanctions at an appropriate level. 
In many respects, the institutional arrangements of  the excessive deficit procedure and the 
proposed stability pact are similar.  Membership of the proposed Stability Council would 
be limited to those participating in EMU, whereas the excessive deficit procedure provides 
an institutional framework  involving  all  Member States,  but  only  those participating in 
EMU can vote on giving notice to a Member State to take measures for deficit reduction 
(Article 1  04c(9)) and the imposition of  sanctions (1 04c(11 )). 
Some  scope  exists  within  the  Treaty  for  further  developing  the  excessive  deficit 
procedure.  Article 1  04c( 14)  provides for  the replacement  of the  Protocol  on  excessive 
deficits by the Council acting unanimously on the basis of  a proposal from the Commission 
and  after consulting the European Parliament and  the ECB.  However,  it  would not be 
possible to. alter provisions in the Treaty itself: hence, it appears that the Council could not 
render sanctions automatic nor amend any of the voting procedures established in Article 
104c. 
3.4  ASSESSMENT ON LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
The above examination leads to the following comments: 
- all  the Member States should  play  a full  part in  the  definition  of any  new rules  and 
procedures; 
- ne\v arrangements should neither contradict nor substitute the existing provisions of  the 
Treaty; 
- in  some respects,  decision-taking by  the  sub-group of I\1ember  States participating  in 
El\1U  is  already provided  for  in  the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  and  this  has  son1e 
similarities with the proposed Stability Council; 
- a clarification in  adYance  of hoYv  sanctions would be  applied  and  their  quantification 
could be considered as making the existing provisions of  Article 1  04c more explicit; 
- the automatic triggering and application of  sanctions without going through the various 
steps of  the excessive deficit procedure appear to be inconsistent with the Treaty; could 
this be handled by son1e agreement on when and  at what speed the successive steps of 
the excessive deficit procedure \vould be implemented? 
l\1ost of  the aims of  the stability pact can be met by an effective use of  the broad economic 
policy guidelines and by an accelerated implementation of  the steps of the excessive deficit 
procedure. In order to define more clearly how these arrangements would work it would 
probably  be  useful  to  introduce  secondary  legislation  based  on  articles 103(5)  and 
1  04c(14) of the Treaty (although voting procedures and Parliament involvement differ in 
these two cases). - 13 -
PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY ON EU AFFECTING 
NATIONAL BUDGETARY POLICIES 
Treaty  Institutional arrangement 
Content  provision  for implementation 
1. Co-ordination  Economic policy co-ordination  103(1)  Co-ordination in Council 
(non binding)  Broad economic policy guidelines  103(2)  Council Recommendation 
Multilateral surveillance  103(3)  Council meetings 
-monitoring of  Community/Member States 
- consistency of  policy with guidelines 
- overall assessment and (public) Recommendations  103(4)  Council Recommendation 
- inconsistency \vith guidelines 
-jeopardising function of  EMU 
Rules adopted in accordance with Article 189c  103(5)  Council acting by QMV 
2. Rules  No monetary fmancing  104  Court of Justice 
(binding)  No privileged access  104a  Court of  Justice 
No bail out  104b  Court ofjustice 
3. Excessive deficit  Monitoring  104c(2)  Commission 
(binding) 
* 
** 
*** 
Report if  104c(3)  Commission report 
- violation of  criteria 
-risk of excessive deficit 
Discussion of  report  104c(4)  Monetary Ctte. (opinion) 
Existence of excessive deficit  104c(5&6)  Council Decision* 
Action against a Member States 
- confidential recommendation  104c(7)  Council Recommendation** 
- public recommendation  104c(8)  Council Recommendation** 
- notice to a Member State  104c(9)  Council Decision*** 
- sanctwns  Hl-kt11J  Courh.:il  Dcl·1sion~~"' 
- abrogation  104c(12)  Council Decision** 
QMV of all Member States 
T\vo-tlmds  m~1ority of all  Member State::;  weighted according  to Article  148c2J  except the:  I\kmber State 
concerned 
Two-thirds majority of all Member States participating in EMU \\eighted according to Article 148(2) except 
the Member State concerned - 14-
4.  Il\1PROVING BUDGET DISCIPLINE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Although Union level  surveillance procedures and  sanctions will  have  a  role  to play in 
enforcing  budget  discipline,  of primary  importance  will  be  the  establishing  of a  firm 
commitment to continued  sound  public  finance  at national  level  and  the  strengthening · 
where necessary of national budgetary rules  and  procedures.  It may  be  recalled  that a 
provision in Article 3 of  the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure requires Member 
States to ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their 
obligations as regards excessive deficits. There is growing evidence from academic studies 
that budgetary and legal arrangements impact on the sound management of  public finances 
and that certain features are conducive to better control (see Box on "The role of  national 
budgetary  procedures"  for  a  summary  of some  recent  work).  Experience  with  the 
convergence programmes has also highlighted weaknesses and helpful features in national 
systems. 
Areas which appear to be in particular need of  attention in a number of  countries include: 
- public  expenditure  planning  and  control:  the  parts  played  by  the  different  actors 
involved; multi-annual approach; commitment to binding nominal targets, etc.; 
- co-ordination bet\veen the different levels of  general government; 
- monitoring and  correction mechanisms:  reinforced regular and transparent monitoring 
( c.f  Swedish  convergence programme); linkage with corrective measures;  scope for 
pre-specified automatic measures when slippage in deficit identified. 
Many changes have already been introduced in recent years and these experiences need to 
be shared more fully  between !\1ember States. In the end  achieving stable public finances 
will depend on the successful self-discipline of Member States.  However, this is  an area 
where subsidiarit:-.  arc:  sensitiYe issues concerning parliamentary soYereignty 
over budgetary policy,  and  in  any  case no  single model \Vould  be appropriate given  the 
diversity of  historical and constitutional backgrounds. 
!\Jore \York  is  required  in  area  to  deepen  the  analysis  and  bring  forward  concrete 
proposals  at  national  leveL  Self-discipline  by  Member  States  (including  effective 
correction mechanisms) will  be of crucial importance in order to  achieve the underlying 
objectives of the stability pact.  A possibility is  that countries vvould  agree as part of the 
pact to complete a review of their national budgetary systems and  put forn·ard proposals 
for  reform where  appropriate.  Could  the  l\1onetary  Committee  embark  on an  exercise 
based on l\1ember  States'  O\Vh analyses  on the scope for reinforcing national  budgetary 
rules and procedures') - 15  -
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL BUDGETARY PROCEDURES 
Experience of several  countries indicates that budgetary procedures,  i.e.  the rules  according to which 
budgets are drafted by the government, amended and passed by the parliament, and implemented by the 
government, are important for attaining and maintaining fiscal discipline.  This can be achieved by two 
types  of (not  mutually  exclusive)  institutional  commitment technology:  commitment to  a  numerical 
target or commitment to an appropriate procedure. The underlying considerations are  explained in 
great detail in a study by von Hagen and Harden (1994)(9). 
According to the study, the setting of an ex ante binding numerical target limits the scope for excessive 
spending already early in the budgeting process and also prevents scope for amendment at later stages. In 
order to strengthen the link between current decisions and future outcomes of the budget process it would 
also be useful to adopt and adhere to multi-annual expenditure targetsOO). 
A fundamental rule to be applied seems to be that conflicts over resources should be resolved through the 
budget  process.  The  budget  should  neither  be  bypassed,  nor  reduced  to  a  mere  record  of prior 
commitments.  Conflicting  claims  and  decisions between them should be  clearly  identified  and  made. 
Moreover, the budget process should be structured so as to ensure that there is a clear accountability for 
the annual budget deficit. 
According to von Hagen and Harden, specific features contribute to limiting public deficits in the course 
of  the budgeting process. Within the government, the distribution ofpmvers benveen "spending" ministers 
on the one hand and the prime minister and finance minister on the other is very important. If the latter 
have  a  position  of strategic  dominance,  deficits  are  likely  to  be  smaller  as  they  are  generally  more 
concerned with the collective  interest than  "spending"  ministers who  are  interested  in expanding the 
resources of  their mvn ministries. In Germany, the finance minister has a predominant role in drawing up 
the budget plan.  He  can change spending proposals of other ministers without their agreement.  If the 
latter demand a decision of the government in particularly important matters, the finap.ce  minister has a 
right of veto.  In the parliamentm:v stage, the balance.of povrers between goyernment and the parliament 
plays a key  role.  Representatives  of constituencies are  subject to  the same  conflict between collective 
interest  in  socio1  efficiency  of public  expenditures  and  the  indiYidual  interest  in  m::r"\imising  the  net 
benefits for particular constituencies. Hence,  the bigger the scope for  amendments by the parliament. the 
higher is the risk of excessiYe  deficits,  unless there is  a commitment to finance all additional spending. 
(HmYever.  such  a commitment must  actually be  enforced.  In Italy.  for  example.  a formal  commitment 
exists  but  it  has  not  been  applied  in practice.)  During  the  implementation  phase  of the  budget.  two 
conflicting  forces  become  important:  the  degree  to  which  the  budget  law  binds  goyernment's  actions 
during the fiscal year,  and the degree of flexibility to  respond to  unforeseen events.  If the budget needs 
modification at this stage,  there is a risk of increasing the deficit.  Again,  spending ministers are  more 
likely to give in to demands for increased expenditures and are more prone to overrun the limits set by the 
budget law than the prime minister or finance minister and should, hence, only have limited powers. 
(9)  See  von  Hagen,  J.  and  I.  Harden  (1994),  National budget  processes  and fiscal  performance,  in: 
European Economy, Reports and Studies,  No.  3,  pp.  311-418.  The authors also  provide empirical 
evidence that countries using such commitment technologies have systematically lmver deficits and 
public debt levels relative to GDP than others 
(10)  While some kind of multi-annual planning exists in a number of Member States, they are generally 
not binding and the deficit is not the target variable. - 16-
The above  considerations have only dealt with budgetary discipline at the level  of central government. 
However, public finances at lower government levels also play a decisive role for the size of the general 
governments' deficit. The institutionalised budgetary co-ordination in the German federal system provides 
a  good  example.  On the one  hand,  there are  clear budgetary procedures  and  principles  (e.g.  that  all 
territorial  authorities  are  obliged  to  present  plans  for  revenues  and  expenditures  in  a  medium-tern1 
framework  also  consistent  with  macro-economic  needs),  on the  other,  the  German  fiscal  constitution 
clearly  determines  the  distribution of government  tasks  and  their financing  between  the  government 
levels. A more recent example is Belgium. Due to the federalisation and the decentralisation of decision-
making in 1988, it became necessary to  set up mechanisms to guarantee the  co-ordination and overall 
consistency of fiscal  policies.  To this end, the "Conseil  Superieur des  Finances"  (CSF)  was  created to 
assess the fiscal positions of  the general government and of  its sub-sectors. 
While fiscal decentralisation involves the risk of the generation of excessive deficits at lower government 
levels, the dangers of centralisation should, however, not be neglected. Persson and Tabellini(ll) shmv in 
a political economy model that the latter generates more local public goods (i.e.  higher public spending) 
than a  decentrali'Sed  system.  Lower  government  levels  generally know  better the  preferences  of their 
citizens, and the scope for rent-seeking tends to be smaller. If  the financing of local public goods lies in 
the responsibility of those who take the decision on their provision, the danger of excessive deficits is also 
limited. 
(11)  Persson,  T.  and  G.  Tabellini  (1994),  Does  centralization increase  the  size  of  government?.  in:  European 
Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 765-773. - 17-
5.  ELEI\ffiNTS OF A CO:MJ\1UNITY PROCEDURE FOR THE APPLICATION OF A 
STABILITY PACT 
The framework proposed by the stability pact would seem to imply some strengthening of 
co-ordination,  commitment  and  monitoring  procedures  at  Union  level.  The  interplay 
between, on the one hand, the setting of objectives and the taking of  measures at national 
level  and,  on the  other hand,  the coordination of economic  policies  (especially  in the 
budgetary field)  at Union level needs to be reinforced.  Elements that should probably be 
present include: 
- a medium-term perspective: first, for those Member States entering EMU with deficits 
close  to  the  3%  of GDP  limit,  to  cover  the  transition  towards  the  medium-term 
objective; arid  second, because in practice actual budget balance results will  fluctuate 
around the desired medium-term path; 
- sufficient flexibility to accommodate country-specific differences while at the same time 
ensuring respect of the budgetary disciplines of the Treaty (e.g.  it may be considered 
appropriate by some countries to aim at government surpluses in the medium term); 
- scope for  greater interplay  and  feedback  between the· EU level  institutions  and  the 
setting of  policy goals at national level; 
- monitoring  systems  that  provide  early  warning  of potential  serious  deviations  from 
medium-term objectives and of  the risk ofbreaching deficit limits; 
- some  form  of pre-commitment  by  Member  States  before  their  Union  partners  to 
corrective mechanisms  to  be  applied  when budgetary  developments  are  moving  off 
track. 
These desirable features would seem to iJ?lply: 
- regular statements by rv1ember States of their medium-term budgetary strategy: in effect 
these  might  be  medium-term  budgetary  "stability  programmes",  ·which  would  be 
successors to the convergence programmes; 
- some assessment of the appropriateness of the overall budgetary stance for the EI\fU 
zone implied by the positions adopted by the individual Member States (e.g.  is  overall 
balance on the \\·ay to being  achieved?)~ 
- some consultation procedures at EU level which would mean that the national policy 
statements  were  not  already  "set  in  stone"  when  they  were  presented,  but  which 
allowed for some amendments to be introduced to meet Council concerns before such 
"stability programmes" were fully endorsed by the Councit such an endorsement would 
thus  be  much  stronger than  the  present  taking  note  and  welcoming  of the  present 
convergence programmes; 
- development of  more transparent monitoring, especially at national level but also at EU 
level; 
- pre-specification  of spending  curbs  or  tax  increases  to  be  introduced  when  the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit departs significantly from medium-term path. - 18-
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing  discussion raises many issues and uncovers a number of uncertainties  on 
which the comments of Committee members are invited and to which they will no doubt 
wish to add their own points. The stability pact proposal stems from the need not only for 
each Member State to achieve sound public finances before participating in EMU but also 
for strict budgetary discipline to be maintained once in EMU; to this end the pact proposal 
in effect suggests a fuller specification and reinforcement of  the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty and of  existing practices for economic policy co-ordination. 
A consensus already appears to exist that: 
- the requirements for participation in EMU (either in the first group or at a later date) 
should in no way be changed; 
more  generally,  any  new  arrangements  should  be  fully  consistent  with the  existing 
Treaty and no amendment ofthe-rreaty·should be envisaged in this respect. 
Maintenance  of sound public  finance  positions  in  stage  three  of EMU will  require  a 
strengthened commitment from individual Member States. In particular, respect of  the 3% 
of GDP limit  for the government deficit  in all  but exceptional  circumstances will  imply 
aiming  in  the  medium  term  for  a  government  balance  considerably  stronger  than  this 
reference value limit,  because of cyclical fluctuations  and  other shocks;  moreover,  there 
are additional sound economic reasons for adopting such a policy stance. However, in the 
light of  the discussion in the earlier parts of  this note, does the Committee agree that: 
- the government  deficit/surplus  should  be  the  main  operational  objective~  seeking  to 
impose an  additional  constraint on the gross debt  ratio  appears to be  superfluous,  as 
permanently keeping the deficit  beloYv  3'/0 of GDP would ensure a downward trend in 
the debt ratio to well below 60o/o of  GDP; 
- the medium-term objective of a budget position close to balance is  appropriate for the 
Union as  a whole (as already set in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines),  but some 
differentiation  for  individual  countries  n1ay  be  desirable  from  the  econon1ic  point  of 
vie\v  ~  ho\vever the question ofho\v to attain a coherent budgetary stance at E1vfU level 
requires further consideration; 
- a reinforcement  of self-discipline  at the national  level  will  be  required,  based where 
necessary on a strengthening of  national budgetary rules and procedures; 
- changes may be needed in  the way medium-term budgetary plans  are  developed  and 
implemented  and  in  the way they  are handled  and  endorsed  at  Union level  (national 
"stability programmes"?). 
Discussion is  also invited on the way in which Union-level procedures could  be further 
developed so that they would act as a more effective deterrent against national budgetary 
indiscipline. In particular: - 19-
- should the way in  which sanctions  are  to be applied  under Article 1  04c( 11)  be pre-
specified .and quantified? 
- given that the automatic application of sanctions  once  a country  exceeds  the  3% of 
GDP  deficit limit does not seem to be compatible with the Treaty nor desirable in all 
cases  from  an  economic  point  of view,  how  can  the  steps  already  foreseen  in  the 
excessive  deficit  procedure for  the third  stage  of EMU be  speeded  up  and  applied 
incisively? 
- can the proposed Stability Council be considered as a formation of the Ecofin Council 
in which certain decisions are only taken by EMU participants, as already provided for 
in some of  the steps of  the excessive deficit procedure? - 20-
ANNEX 
Government deficit, as a share of  GDP, df, can be written as: 
l+y 
wherey is nominal GDP growth (assumed constant). 
The primary surplus, fb is defined as: 
j 
(2)  ft =- dt +-bt-l 
l+y 
where i is the (constant) nominal rate of  interest on government bonds02). If  d1 is constant 
or is set to follo·w  a pre-determined path, ft needs to be set at the appropriate level each 
period in order to fulfil (2). 
Although,  for given levels of the budget deficit,  the interest rate does not influence the 
speed of debt reduction, it affects the "degree of hardship" in bringing down the level of 
debt, through the required level of  primary balance. 
Attaining and  sustaining a certain budget deficit  implies different  efforts according to the 
initial level of  debt and the assumption of  the interest rate-growth rate differential. 
Tables 1 and 2 present some calculations concerning the behavior of  the stock of debt and 
the required primary surplus in the case of a country with a high initial level of public debt 
(  120~0 of GDP), under the assumption of a 2% interest rate-gro\vth rate differential, if the 
budget deficit  is  kept  constant at  1  o/o  and  3~/o of GDP,  respectively.  Table  3 presents  a 
scenario of gradual re,duction over 4 years of the budget deficit from 3o/o  to 1  o/o  of GDP, 
under the san1e assumptions on the interest rate-growth rate differential. 
(12)  It  goes without saying that the  follov.'ing  numerical simulations have  only  an illustratin purpose and by no 
means should be taken as  "realistic" projections.  In particular, the assumption of exogeneity of the interst 
rate -grov.th rate differential is highly restrictive. The real rate of interest is exogenous if  there exists perfect 
substitutability between government debt and real assets  or, in an open economy, between public debt and 
assets  denominated in foreign currencies.  The real grov,th of GDP is  exogenous  if the  so-called Ricardian 
equivalence holds.  Nominal variables are constant if we assume that the demand for money is  "quantitative" 
and money supply grows at a steady rate. - 21  -
A sustained budget deficit of 1% of GDP allows a much faster reduction of the stock of 
debt.  However,  even  when it is  attained  gradually  over a  number  of years,  it  implies 
historically high levels of  primary surpluses (see Table 4). 
Table 5 presents the same simulations under the assumption of a higher gro\Vth  rate of 
GDP (  6% instead of 5%  ), as one would anticipate in the case of countries experiencing a 
catching up process. 
For a  given level  of budget deficit,  this  leads  to a  faster  reduction  in  the  debt  ratio, 
allowing,  at  the  same  time,  a  slightly  lower primary  surpluses  (compare  Table 2  and 
Table 5).  It can be shown easily that, for a given initial level of debt of 120% of GDP, a 
1% lower interest rate-growth rate differential allows a sustained 1  o/o higher budget deficit 
without affecting the time profile of  public debt: Under the assumptions: i=7%, y=5% and 
d=2%,  after ten years the debt ratio is reduced from  120% to 90% of GDP.  The same 
stock of  debt is attained under the assumptions: i=7%, y=6% and d=2%03). 
(13)  Notice, however, that the equilibrium level of  the debt ratio is not the same. It corresponds to 42o/o of 
GDP in the first case and 53o/o of GDP in the second case. - 22-
Table 1 
REDUCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT 
ASSUMING A CONSTANT BUDGET DEFICIT OF 1  o/o  OF GDP 
bo ,  120% 
7% 
y  5% 
time  b(t)  f(t)  d(t) 
1  115%  7.0%  1.0% 
2  111%  6.7%  1.0% 
3  107%  6.4%  1.0% 
4  102%  6.1%  1.0% 
5  99%  5.8%  1.0% 
6  95%  5.6%  1.0% 
7  91%  5.3%  1.0% 
8  88%  5.1%  1.0% 
9  85 5~  4.9 fc  1.0 5~ 
10  82%  4.7%  1.0% 
bo  = initial level of  public debt (% of GDP) 
b  = leYel of  public debt (0/o of GDP) 
d  = budget deficit (% of GDP) 
f  =primary surplus (% of GDP) -23-
Table 2 
REDUCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT 
ASSUMING A CONSTANT BUDGET DEFICIT OF 3o/o OF GDP 
bo  120% 
7% 
y  5% 
time  b(t)  f(t)  d(t) 
1  117%  5.0%  3.0% 
2  115%  4.8%  3.0% 
3  112%  4.6%  3.0% 
4  110%  4.5%  3.0% 
5  108%  4.3%  3.0% 
6  106%  4.2%  3.0% 
7  104%  4.0%  3.0% 
8  102%  3.9%  3.0% 
9  100~  3.8 s:  3.0% 
10  98%  3.6%  3.0% 
bo  =initial level of public debt(% of GDPJ 
b  = le\·e] of  public debt (% of  GDP) 
d  = budget deficit (% of  GDP) 
f  =primary surplus  ofGDP) -24-
Table 3 
REDUCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT 
ASSUMING A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN BUDGET DEFICIT 
bo  120% 
7% 
y  5% 
time  b(t)  f(t)  d(t) 
1  117%  5.0%  3.0% 
2  114%  5.3%  2.5% 
3  111%  5.6%  2.0% 
4  107%  5.9%  1.5% 
5  103%  6.1%  1.0% 
6  99%  5.9%  1.0% 
7  95%  5.6%  1.0% 
8  92%  5.4%  1.0% 
9  88~o  5.1%  1.0°;o 
10  85°/o  4.9%  1.0% 
bo  = initialleYel of public debt (% of GDP) 
b  = leYel of  public debt(% of GDP) 
d  =budget deficit (% of GDP) 
f  = primary surplus (% of GDP) -25-
Table 4 
BUDGETARY POSITIONS IN PERIODS OF FISCAL DISCIPLINE: BUDGET DEFICIT 
LOWER THAN 3°/o OF GDP IN THE 1980's 
d  dC  f 
Germany (1983-90)  -1.6  -0.7  1.3 
France (1984-91)  -2.1  -0.0  0.7 
United Kingdom (1985-91)  -1.6  1.2  2.3 
Denmark (1985-92)  -0.3  0.5  7.7 
Ireland (1989-95)  -2.3  -0.0  4.6 
Austria (198 8-92)  -2.5  0.4  1.6 
Finland ( 1980-91)  3.0  1.0  4.5 
Sweden (1986-91)  2.5  2.0  8.3 
d = net lending (  +) or net borrowing (-) of  general government (annual average) 
f = primary surplus (  +) or deficit (-) 
11 c  II  suffix:  cyclical]_\ -adjusted Yariables 
fC 
2.0 
0.7 
1.1 
7.2 
4.7 
1.2 
3.5 
6.3 - 26-
Table 5 
REDUCTION OF PUBLIC DEBT 
ASSUMING A CONSTANT BUDGET DEFICIT OF 3% OF GDP 
bo  120% 
7% 
y  6% 
time  b(t)  f(t)  d(t) 
1  116%  4.9%  3.0% 
2  113%  4.7%  3.0% 
3  109%  4.4%  3.0% 
4  106%  4.2%  3.0% 
5  103%  4.0%  3.0% 
6  100%  3.8%  3.0% 
7  98%  3.6%  3.0% 
8  95%  3.4%  3.0% 
9  93  ~~ 
'"""  -'!  c: 
..) •..)  /C  3.01~ 
10  90%  3.1%  3.0% 
bo  =  initial level of public debt (% of GDP) 
b  ==level of public debt(% of GDP) 
d  =  budget deficit (% of GDP) 
f  =  primary surplus (% of GDP) - 27-
Table 6 
CYCLICAL COMPONENT OF BUDGET DEFICIT (1980-94) 
large  small 
countries4  countries5  EUR 15 
Average cyclical component  1  -1.1  -1.2 
(%ojGDP) 
Maximum (negative) cyclical component  -2.8  (UK)  -5.6  (SF) 
(%ojGDP)" 
Frequency2  8%  11% 
of c <= -2% ojGDP 
Adjusted Frequency3  27%  38% 
of c <= -2% ofGDP 
c = cyclical component 
1)  average of  the cyclical components being negative 
2)  number of  observations of  cyclical component being lower than -2~/o of  GDP \Vi thin 
the 15 years considered 
3)  number of  observations of  cyclical component being lower than -2% of  GDP for the 
number of  years in which GDP growth< trend growth 
4)  Germany, Spain, France, Italy, United Kingdom 
5)  EUR 15 without .large countries (see 4)) 
-1.2 
10% 
34% 